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Abstract
In this paper we de¯ne a new family of solutions for the class of coop-
erative games with transferable utility, in which the set of players exhibits
a structure of a priori unions. This family is deeply connected with the
Shapley value for games with transferable utility but, moreover, we as-
sume a solidarity strong connection among all the components of each
union. As a consequence of this, they are disposed to delegate one coali-
tion of members of the union to negotiate with the other unions, and,
therefore, each union will have a representative coalition. Furthermore,
three interesting solutions that belong to this family of values are studied,
as well as the non cooperative selection of the best representative coalition
for each union.
Key words: TU-games with unions, Shapley value, representative coalition.
JEL code: C71, C72.
1 Introduction
Classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games, to
abbreviate), involves a set of players in such a way that if a coalition of them
decides to cooperate, they can guarantee a certain payo®. To share out the
payo® of the total coalition, di®erent solutions were studied in the literature.
One of the most important of these solutions is the Shapley value (1953).
With the passing of time, due to the complexity of most of real situations, the
traditional model of TU-games was enriched. Aumann and Dreze (1974) and
Owen (1977) considered TU-games where there is a system of unions among
the players, which is formed previously to the negotiation process, and that
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1conditions it. Aumann and Dreze's value for TU-games with unions is de¯ned
with the condition of no transference of payo® among the unions, that is, each
union only obtains the payo® that it can guarantee itself. The Owen value for
TU-games with unions is constructed in two steps. In the ¯rst step, the unions
decide the quantity each union receives, with the possibility of transference of
payo® among them. In the second step, the division of the allocation of each
union among its members is determined, taking into account the chances of each
player to join other unions.
In this framework, we valuate the TU-games with unions from an alternative
point of view. Our ¯rst assumption is that each union implies a strong com-
promise among their members in such a way that it is no possible to reach an
agreement among a proper subset of a union and members of di®erent unions.
Consider, for example, a situation involving a set of users that have to pay the
costs of a public good and these users are grouped by the company they belong
to. In this situation, a contract among the members of each union can forbid all
the users to join another company to share expenses. Our second assumption
is that the strong contract which generates a union is also a solidarity contract
that leads to the players within a union to divide equally bene¯ts or losses.
The last assumption consists on accepting that each union participates in the
negotiation process by means of a representative coalition. For example, it is
usual that a bank account involves a group of persons and that the associated
contract allows one member to carry out all the transactions concerning the
account. With these assumptions, we de¯ne a new family of solutions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we de¯ne the family of
solutions by means of marginal contributions in all the possible arrival orders of
players. Moreover, we identify the solutions as the Shapley values of TU-games.
In section 3, we study three interesting solutions of this family and ¯nally, in
section 4, we give a non cooperative justi¯cation of the strength of some of these
solutions.
2 Probabilistic representative values
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N;v), where
N = f1;:::;ng is the set of players and v : 2N ! R is the characteristic function,
which assigns to each coalition S 2 2N the value v(S), i.e., the bene¯ts that S
can generate independently of the players in N n S. We assume that v(;) = 0.
G(N) denotes the set of TU-games with set of players N. A solution for TU-
games is a function f : G(N) ! Rn, where the payo® vector f(N;v) is allocated
2to each TU-game (N;v).
A TU-game with unions is a triple (N;v;P), where (N;v) is a TU-game
and P = fP1;:::;Pmg is a partition of the set of players N. We denote M =
f1;:::;mg. For a TU-game with unions (N;v;P), the associated quotient game
is the TU-game, (M;vP), where the set of players can be identi¯ed with the





. We denote by U(N) the
set of TU-games with unions where the set of players is N. A solution for TU-
games with unions is a function f : U(N) ! Rn that assigns to each TU-game
with unions (N;v;P) the payo® vector f(N;v;P).
Games with unions were ¯rst studied in Owen (1977). In that paper, Owen
considers that the partition given by the unions modi¯es the negotiation possi-
bilities of the players and de¯nes a variation of the Shapley value which takes
this fact into account: the Owen value.
The meaning of the unions in this paper is di®erent from Owen's. We con-
sider that a union is a set of solidary players, in the sense that:
a) the negotiation takes place among the unions,
b) the players of each union are anonymous, and
c) the bene¯ts are equally allocated to its members.
Our aim is to modify the Shapley value for TU-games with unions under this
new interpretation of the unions.
The main idea we take into account to provide such a modi¯cation is the
natural feature that unions can only negotiate through representatives. Notice
that players are solidary within unions, so we will not consider that a union is
represented by a precise set of its members, but by a portion of its members.
Since the representation system that each union will use is not ¯xed a priori,
we will introduce a family of values instead of a particular value: the family of
probabilistic representative values.
2.1 The de¯nition of the family
The family of probabilistic representative values assumes that each Pl can be
represented by any subset of k players of the union (1 · k · jPlj), where k is







k = 1;for all l 2 M
1
A. Notice that this family
includes values based on very natural representation systems. For instance, a
union Pl can agree that all its members must sign in order that Pl is able to make
a decision in the negotiation process (in which case ql
jPlj = 1, ql
k = 0 for all k 2
f1;:::;jPlj ¡ 1g). When a particular representation system for each union is
3¯xed, we have a particular probabilistic representative value. Next, we formally
introduce the family of probabilistic representative values. In the next section,
we study three specially relevant values in this family.
Take a TU-game with unions (N;v;P) with P = fP1;:::;Pmg and suppose




where each ql is interpreted as above and satis¯es that ql





k = 1. An order for N is de¯ned as a bijection ¾ : N ! N,
where ¾(k) denotes the player in N which occupies the k-th position, and ¾¡1(i)
denotes the position of player i in the order given by ¾. We denote by ¦(N)
the set of all n! orders for N. To de¯ne the probabilistic representative value
for (N;v;P) with representative system q, we use the heuristic interpretation of
the Shapley value. So, we consider that the contribution of a player i 2 Pl to
a coalition S must be taken into account only if (S \ Pl) [ fig fully represents
union Pl and S \ Pl does not; in this case, the contribution of i to S is the
contribution in the quotient game of Pl to the unions fully represented by the
players in S. To write this in a formal way, we need to introduce some notations.





i 2 Pr : ¾¡1(i) < k
ª¯
¯ is the number of players in the union Pr
satisfying the condition of preceding the position k.
² R¾
k = fr 2 M : n¾
k(r) > 0g is the set of unions with players placed before
position k.
² Q¾
k = fr 2 M : n¾
















j indicates the probability
for all the unions of L n flg of being represented before position k.









j is the probability
for all the unions that do not belong to L [flg of being represented after
position k.
4De¯nition 1 The probabilistic representative value for the TU-game with unions
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To clarify this de¯nition, we introduce two examples. In the ¯rst one, we il-
lustrate how to calculate these solutions and, in the other one, we show a real
situation that veri¯es all the assumptions we imposed at the beginning.
Example 1 Consider N = f1;2;3g, P1 = f1;2g and P2 = f3g with q =
((1
3; 2
3);1). In addition, v(P1) = 2, v(P2) = 1, and v(N) = 4. In Table 1, we


























312 1 2 1
321 2 1 1
Table 1. The expected contributions
1It is convenient to point out that in the probabilistic representative values we only need
the value of the game for groups of unions.
2Note that ql
n¾
k+1(l) is the probability assigned in the union Pl to the player ¾(k). This
probability must be considered because the union Pl is excluded in the de¯nition of p¾;q(L).

































Example 2 At the moment, the Security Council of the United Nations con-
sists of 15 members. They are disposed so that 5 of them are permanent and
the other ones are elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years.
Each member has a vote and decisions on substantive matters require 9 votes.
Moreover, all the 5 permanent members have the \veto"power, that is, all their
votes are necessary to pass a resolution.
Therefore, we may consider that the members are grouped in two unions
P1 = fPermanent membersg and P2 = fNon permanent membersg, and q =
(q1;q2) with q1 = (0;0;0;0;1) and q2 = (0;0;0;1;0;0;0;0;0;0).






0:19627; i 2 P1
0:001865; i 2 P2:
As was to be expected, the permanent members have much more power than
the non permanent members.
2.2 The connection with the Shapley value
The family of probabilistic representative values of a TU-game with unions can
not only be expressed as we have de¯ned before, but also as the Shapley values
of a TU-game related to the TU-game with unions and the representation sys-
tem. To see this relation, we consider the following notation:
Given a coalition S ½ N, a set of unions P = fP1;:::;Pmg, and a represen-
tation system q,
² nS(r) = jPr \ Sj is the number of players in the union Pr belonging to S.
² RS = fr 2 M : Pr \ S 6= ;g = fr 2 M : nS(r) > 0g is the set of unions
with players in S.
² QS = fr 2 M : Pr ½ Sg = fr 2 M : nS(r) = jPrjg is the set of unions
with all the players in S.
² PS = RS n QS.








k indicates the probability for all
the unions of L of being represented in the coalition S.








k is the probability for all
the unions that do not belong to L of being represented in the coalition
N n S.
In the next theorem, we establish that the probabilistic representative value
of a TU-game with unions is the Shapley value Á of a TU-game in which the value
of each coalition is the expectation of the combination of unions represented by
the coalition.
Theorem 1 For all (N;v;P) 2 U(N) and for all associated representation
system q,
¯q(N;v;P) = Á(N;vq)
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Note that if (N;v;P) 2 U(N) is such that P is the trivial structure of unions
ff1g;:::;fngg, then ¯q(N;v;P) = Á(N;v).
Example 3 If we consider Example 1 and calculate the associated game, we
obtain that
vq(f1g) = vq(f2g) = 1
3v(P1) = 2
3, vq(f3g) = v(P2) = 1,
vq(f1;2g) = v(P1) = 2, vq(f1;3g) = vq(f2;3g) = 2
3v(P2) + 1
3v(N) = 2, and
vq(N) = v(N) = 4:
3 On three probabilistic representative values
In this section we will study three particular cases in the family of probabilistic
representative values: the ¯, ° and ± values.
73.1 The ¯ value
The ¯ value is the probabilistic representative value where, ¯xed an order in
the players, we assign the uniform discrete probability to the union. Then, all
the players in a union have the same probability of being the representative
player. In this way, the expression for each TU-game with unions (N;v;P),
with ql
k = 1
jPlj for all k 2 f1;:::;jPljg and l 2 M, is
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The next proposition shows that the ¯ value can be calculated by computing
the Shapley value in the quotient game, which is the game related to the unions,
and dividing the value of each union equally among their members.
Proposition 1 For all (N;v;P) 2 U(N), for all i 2 Pl 2 P, and for all Pl 2 P,
¯i(N;v;P) = 1
jPljÁl(M;vP).
83.2 The ° and ± values
The ° value is the probabilistic representative value where, given an order of
the players, the last player is chosen as the representative player. So, for each
TU-game with unions (N;v;P), taking ql
jPlj = 1 for all l 2 M, we obtain that



























if Pl ½ f¾(1);:::;¾(k)g
0 otherwise.
The ± value is the probabilistic representative value where, for each order, the
¯rst player who arrives is the representative player. For each TU-game with
unions (N;v;P), considering ql
1 = 1 for all l 2 M, we have that
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if Pl \ f¾(1);:::;¾(k ¡ 1)g = ;
0 otherwise.
Both values can be computed as weighted Shapley values in the quotient
game and dividing the quantity obtained for a union among the players of this
union (see Kalai and Samet, 1987). The same happens in the case of the ¯
value (see Proposition 1). But, however, not all the probabilistic representative
values coincide with weighted Shapley values in the quotient game. In the next
example we show it.
Example 4 Consider N = f1;2;3;4;5;6g and P = fP1;P2;P3g, with P1 =
f1g, P2 = f2;3g, and P3 = f4;5;6g. The representation system is given by
q = (1;(1;0);(0;1;0)).










Suppose that for all (N;v;P) 2 U(N), for all i 2 Pl 2 P and for all Pl 2 P,
¯
q
i (N;v;P) = 1
jPljÁw
l (M;vP) for some w 2 Rm
++. Then, for all i 2 Pl 2 P and
for all Pl 2 P, ¯
q











where the last equality is a consequence of the de¯nition of the weighted Shapley
values. Hence, for this set of a priori unions and this representation system, the







Moreover, if we take (N;uS) with S = f1;2;3g, we obtain that for all
i 2 Pl 2 P and for all Pl 2 P, ¯
q


























diction proves that the supposition is not true.
To conclude the section, we give an example that illustrates the behavior of
the three values de¯ned above when we consider unanimity games.




with N = f1;2;3;4g
and the sets of unions given in Table 2. This table shows the proposal of the ¯
value, the ° value, the ± value, and the Owen value for the three partitions of
the set of players.
































































Table 2. On three probabilistic representative values















3Given S ½ N, the unanimity game (N;uS) is de¯ned by uS(T) =
½
1 if S ½ T
0 otherwise.































Pl 2 P. This always happens with the unions that have at least one player
in the carrier of the unanimity game. Then, in the case of the ° value, all
the players receive the same. It does not always happen with the other values,
although in the three cases the players in each union obtain the same because
the three values belong to the family of probabilistic representative values.
In spite of the fact that the payo®s in the Owen value for the unions are equal
to the payo®s in the case of the ¯ value, the Owen value does not give the same
payo® to all the players in each union (the Owen value is not a probabilistic
representative value) because the players who do not contribute to the other
coalitions are always paid zero.
4 A strategic non cooperative selection of the
representation system
This section is devoted to study what happens when the representation system
is not ¯xed and the unions are able to choose the representation system more
convenient to maximize their payo®s. For this purpose, we consider a nego-
tiation process among the unions where each union decides its representation
system independently of the other unions and such that no binding agreements
can be reached among unions. So, we will de¯ne a strategic game to describe
this procedure.
De¯nition 2 Let (N;v;P) be a TU-game with unions such that the set of
unions is P = fP1;:::;Pmg.
The representation strategic game ¡(N;v;P) = (fXlgl2M;fUlgl2M) is an







+ : 9k 2 f1;:::;jPljg with xl









non-empty strategy set of union Pl 2 P. We will denote by x(l;k) the
strategy of union Pl where xl
k = 1.
² Ul : X =
m Y
l=1
Xl ¡! R is the payo® function of the union Pl, which






Proposition 2 Let G(N;v;P) = (f¢(Xl)gl2M;fUlgl2M) be the mixed exten-

























Theorem 2 Let (N;v;P) be a TU-game with unions such that (N;v) is con-
vex4 and let G(N;v;P) = (f¢(Xl)gl2M;fUlgl2M) be the mixed extension of the
corresponding strategic game. The combination of strategies q = (q1;:::;qm),
such that ql = x(l;jPlj) for all l 2 M, is a dominant combination of G(N;v;P).
According to the theorem, independently of the election of the other unions,
the best choice for a union consists on being a strong union, that is, being only
represented by all the players of this union. This means that the best element
of the family of the probabilistic representative values when the game is convex
for the unions is the ° value. On the contrary, the best for a union in a concave
game consists on being represented by just a player of this union, as the next
result establishes.
Corollary 1 Let (N;v;P) be a TU-game with unions such that (N;v) is con-
cave5 and let G(N;v;P) = (f¢(Xl)gl2M;fUlgl2M) be the mixed extension of the
corresponding strategic game. The combination of strategies q = (q1;:::;qm),
such that ql = x(l;1) for all l 2 M, is a dominant combination of G(N;v;P).
4(N;v) is a convex game when v(S [ T) ¡ v(S) · v(R [ T) ¡ v(R) for all S ½ R ½ NnT.
5(N;v) is a concave game when v(S [ T) ¡ v(S) ¸ v(R [ T) ¡ v(R) for all S ½ R ½ NnT.
12References
Aumann R.J. and Dreze J.H. (1974) Cooperative games with coalition structure.
International Journal of Game Theory 3:217-237
Kalai E. and Samet D. (1987) On weighted Shapley values. International Jour-
nal of Game Theory 16:205-222
Owen G. (1977) Values of games with a priori unions, in: Essays in Mathematical
Economics and Game Theory, R. Henn and O. Moeschlin (eds.), Springer-Verlag
76-88
Shapley L.S. (1953) A value for n-person games. Annals of Mathematics Studies
28:307-318
135 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We know that the Shapley value can be interpreted as an average of the marginal









¾(k)(vq) = vq(¾(1);:::;¾(k)) ¡ vq(¾(1);:::;¾(k ¡ 1)) for all 1 · k · n:
Therefore, if the marginal contribution for each order of the Shapley value of
the game vq coincides with the marginal contribution of the same order related






¾(k)(v) for all ¾ 2 ¦(N) and for all 1 · k · n:









































































































































































































































































5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let (N;v;P) 2 U(N). If we de¯ne the set of the permutations where the player
i 2 Pl is in the position k, with 1 · k · n, as ¦k















































We are only interested in the cases where
S




l0 2 M0 Pl0, with M0 ½



















































(n ¡ 1 ¡ k ¡ m0)!
k¡1 Y
t=0
(n ¡ m ¡ t)
#
=







n ¡ 1 ¡ k ¡ m0
m ¡ m0 ¡ 1
¶
=




k + m0 ¡ 1
k ¡ 1
¶µ
n ¡ k ¡ m0
m ¡ m0 ¡ 1
¶
:




k + m0 ¡ 1
k ¡ 1
¶µ
n ¡ k ¡ m0












k + m0 ¡ 1
k ¡ 1
¶µ
n ¡ k ¡ m0






k + m0 ¡ 2
k ¡ 1
¶µ





To prove it, we will apply Stifel's formula.6 So, using this formula several times,
we know that for 1 · k · n ¡ m + 1,
µ














k + m0 ¡ 1
k ¡ 1
¶µ
n ¡ k ¡ m0
m ¡ m0 ¡ 1
¶
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n ¡ k ¡ m0
















n ¡ m0 ¡ k0
m ¡ m0 ¡ 1
¶
:




n ¡ m0 ¡ k0




n ¡ m0 ¡ k + 1
m ¡ m0
¶
and, hence, we have (2).
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k ¡ 1
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n ¡ k ¡ m0
































m0!n!(m ¡ m0 ¡ 1)!
m!
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5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
a) comes from the de¯nition of ¢(Xl). From now on, we will denote ¢(Xl) = Ql.
With regard to b), we will prove it de¯ning the function f :
m Y
r=1
Qr ¡! R such








i (N;v;P). This function f veri¯es that for
all r 2 M and ¸ 2 [0;1],
f(q1;:::;qr¡1;¸ ^ qr + (1 ¡ ¸)~ qr;qr+1;:::;qm) =
¸f(q1;:::;qr¡1; ^ qr;qr+1;:::;qm) + (1 ¡ ¸)f(q1;:::;qr¡1; ~ qr;qr+1;:::;qm):
To simplify, we denote ¹ q = (q1;:::;qr¡1;¸ ^ qr + (1 ¡ ¸)~ qr;qr+1;:::;qm) , ^ q =
(q1;:::;qr¡1; ^ qr;qr+1;:::;qm), and ~ q = (q1;:::;qr¡1; ~ qr;qr+1;:::;qm). By The-
orem 1, we know that f(¹ q) =
X
i2Pl
Ái(N;v¹ q). Moreover, it can be easily seen that
for all S ½ N, v¹ q(S) = ¸v^ q(S)+(1¡¸)v~ q(S). Thus, as the Shapley value satis-
¯es the property of linearity, we know that f(¹ q) =
X
i2Pl




Ái(N;v^ q) + (1 ¡ ¸)
X
i2Pl
Ái(N;v~ q) = ¸f(^ q) + (1 ¡ ¸)f(~ q).

































5.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Let (N;v;P) be a TU-game with unions and take l 2 M. Then, if we denote
(xnx(l;k)) = (x1;:::;xk¡1;x(l;k);xk+1;:::;xm) for all k 2 f1;:::;jPljg, we have
to prove that
Ul(x n x(l;jPlj)) ¸ Ul(x n x(l;k)) for all x 2 X and all k 2 f1;:::;jPlj ¡ 1g:








So, we de¯ne for each x 2 X the subset of orders of players
Ox
i = f¾ 2 ¦(N) such that i represents Pl with the representation system xg.






i which assigns to




18the order g(¾) = ~ ¾, where only the positions given by ¾ of player i and the k-th
player in the union that arrives are exchanged.
Due to the fact that (N;v) is convex7, if we take ¾ 2 O
(xnx
(l;jPlj))
i and ~ ¾ = g(¾),
we have that m
¾;¯
(xnx(l;jPlj))




On the other hand, ¯x








i (v). Then, as g is a bijection,
we can conclude that (3) is true.
7In fact, we only need the convexity of the quotient game (N;vP):
19